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LEGISLATION
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act:
Its Legislative History, Content, and Future
Wesley E. Forte*
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), which became effec-
tive on July 1, 1967,1 was designed to protect consumers by requiring
informative labeling and nondeceptive packaging for consumer com-
modities. The statute has been described as "an information bill.
The first part is information largely about the label .... The second
part of the bill is really, in a way, to try to eliminate the confusion in
words so we have a common terminology, so we all speak the same
language.... It is like establishing an alphabet . .. in size designa-
tions."2 The author seeks to provide an insight into the new alphabet
of the FPLA and the controversial regulations issued by the FTC and
the FDA pursuant to the FPLA through a discussion of the legislative
history and some of the present difficulties under the statute.
I. Tim LAW PRIOR TO TmE FAm PACKAGING AND LABELING ACr'
Among the most elemental and most important laws protecting
consumers are federal statutes dating from the early 1900's, which
prevent the false and misleading labeling of consumer products.3
0 B.B.A. Clark University, 1956; LL.B. New York University School of Law, 1959;
LL.M. (Trade Regulation) New York University School of Law, 1965. Member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. II, 1967).
2. Hearings on H.R. 15440 & S. 985 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 176-77 (1966).
3. The false and misleading labeling of foods and drugs was prohibited by the
Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, which was superseded
by the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (f964).
The power to regulate false and misleading labeling was assumed by the FTC under
§ 5 of the FTC Act, which originally prohibited "unfair methods of competition in
commerce," 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964). See
C. HE ansoN, Trm FkmimuL TPRADE ComanissioN 179-93 (1924). The F*PLA reflected,
in part, congressional dissatisfaction with the inefficiencies of case-by-case law enforce-
ment. While many of the practices outlawed by the FPLA were also illegal under
existing statutes to the extent that these practices were deceptive (e.g., cents-off label-
ing and slack-fill), Congress believed that it would be more efficient and effective to
permit FDA and FTC to promulgate substantive rules regulating these matters. Almost
concurrently with the drive for fair packaging and labeling legislation, the FTC
began the issuance of "Trade Regulation Rules." 16 C.F.R. § 401.1-413.6 (1968).
See Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325,
8364-73 (1964) for a statement by FTC of its authority to issue these rules. The
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These statutes have traditionally been enforced against individual
offenders on a case by case basis, although the federal agencies
having jurisdiction over these matters (primarily the Food and Drug
Administration and the Federal Trade Commission) have also pub-
lished advisory "guides," "trade practice rules," or "trade correspon-
dence" to assist sellers in properly labeling their products.4 The im-
portance of these laws has increased with the proliferation of
packages and with the greater dependence of consumers on labels
rather than upon the services of the comer grocer of another genera-
tion.5
The FDA has jurisdiction over false and misleading labeling
of the most basic consumer products, such as foods, drugs, and
cosmetics,6 while the FTC's concurrent jurisdiction extends to all
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, including the false and misleading labeling of
all productsY However, the FTC generally defers to the FDA in
regulating the labeling of products within the FDA's jurisdiction.8
The Department of Agriculture has jurisdiction over the false and
misleading labeling of meats and poultry,9 but no further comments
concerning this power are contained in this article since meat and
poultry are excluded from the FPLA.10
concurrent enactment of the FPLA and development of FTC's Trade Regulation Rules
(which would have permitted FTC to accomplish many of the objectives of the FPLA
under existing law) will probably be viewed as an incongruity in later years.
4. The FTC's Trade Practice Conference Rules and Guides, which are collected
at 16 C.F.R. § 16.1-240.16 (1968), extend beyond labeling to all unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices. FDA issued publications
entitled "Trade Correspondence," which consisted of advisory opinions, until the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. For a collection of Trade Correspon-
dence, see V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, & Cosmnrc ACT, JUDICIAL
AND ADMINmTaArnE RECORD 1938-1949, at 561-753 (1949). At the present time, the
FDA issues "Statements of General Policy or Interpretation," which are also advisory
rather than legally binding opinions, and are published in the Federal Register.
5. See, e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-17 (1961) (hereinafter
cited as 1961 Hearings). As one witness testified, the retailer's influence has so declined
that we now have a product-buyer rather than a seller-buyer relationship. Id. at 12.
6. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(a), 352(a), 362(a)
(1964). For a description of the various connections with interstate commerce sufficient
to bring these products under federal jurisdiction, see 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(c),(k)
(1964).
7. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964); Fresh Grown
Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
8. See 3 TRADE REc. REP. para. 9850.03 (June 9, 1954). A separate Liaison Agree-
ment between FDA and FTC governs over-the-counter drugs. 3 TRADE REc. REP.
para. 9850.04 (Jan. 23, 1968).
9. Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 75 (1964); Poultry & Poultry Products Inspec-
tion Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 457-58 (1964); 9 C.F.R. § 317.8 (1968).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1459(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1967).
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The FTC has the power to compel affirmative disclosure of facts
in labeling through the issuance of cease and desist orders." Likewise,
the FDA may also indirectly compel affirmative disclosure, since the
determination of whether labeling is false and misleading often de-
pends upon the extent to which relevant and material facts remain
undisclosed. 2 Although the FDA's and the FTC's powers to compel
affirmative disclosure are limited to the prevention of deception, 3
these powers are supplemented by statutes which require statements
of certain specific information on the labels of specific products. The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act imposes such requirements on
foods, drugs, and cosmetics,14 while the various textile and fur
statutes require similar disclosures on textile and fur products.15
These statutes do more than prevent deception; by requiring dis-
closure of the quantity or composition of products, they prevent
confusion and permit the consumer to make value comparisons.
Also intended to prevent deception and confusion in the market-
place are restrictions upon the use of certain words in labeling or
advertising except in conformity with certain pre-determined defini-
tions.' 6 These restrictions primarily define generic names for products
although they also restrict many other types of words and phrases
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). See Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F.
744 (2d Cir. 1922).
12. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1964). The question
of affirmative disclosure frequently arises when a seller wants to use the name of a
minor ingredient as part of the name of the product. The FDA has said that it may
be necessary to disclose the quantity of the minor ingredient on the label. See
V. KL mNFFu & C. DUNN, FEDERAL FooD, DRUG, & Cosm Ec ACT-JUDICIAL AND
ADMrNIsmRATvE RECORD 1938-1949, at 669, 676 (1949).
13. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HIRv. L. REv. 1005,
1047-51 (1967); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64
COLUm. L. REv. 439, 489-90 (1964). The FTC's power to compel affirmative dis-
closure in labeling presents the same issues, arises under the same statute, and is
governed by the same principles as the FTC's power to compel affirmative disclosure
in advertising, with one exception: when a product contains no label and consumers
would be deceived by its physical appearance, the FTC can compel the seller to
affix the required information to the product. See, e.g., Schachnow v. FTC, 1940-
1943 Trade Cas. para. 56, 118 (3d Cir. 1941) (respondent prohibited from represent-
ing hats as new by failing to affix a statement that the hats were "second-hand" or
"used"). The FDA in effect gets affirmative disclosure in similar situations because
products under its jurisdiction must bear certain information (see statutes cited note 14
infra) and because foods which resemble other foods must- be labeled and sold as
imitations. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (1964).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 343(e), (i) (1964) (foods); id. § 352(b)-(f) (drugs); id. § 362
(cosmetics).
15. Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1964); Textile Fiber Products
Identification Act, id. §§ 70-70k; Fur Products Labeling Act, id. §§ 69-69j.
16. The restrictions appear in the FTC's Guides and Trade Practice Rules and the
FTC's Trade Regulation Rules. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
which may influence the decisions of prospective purchasers. 17 The
FDA's definitions and standards of identity, which regulate the
physical composition of products also, in effect, define the generic
designations of foods.'8 These restrictions have resulted in a modest
glossary of words and phrases which can only be used in conformity
with federal regulations, trade practice rules, or guides. 19 This
glossary, when supplemented by requirements of affirmative dis-
closure, government restrictions on the form of such disclosure, and
prohibitions against confusing packaging and labeling practices, is the
"old alphabet," which in some respects has a remarkable resemblance
to the "new alphabet" established by the FPLA.
20
17. Guides and Trade Practice Rules defining generic names for products are so
varied that they almost exceed the imagination. Examples of the many names so
defined and restricted are "fall-out shelter," 16 C.F.R. § 229 (1968); "Epoxy adhesives,"
id. § 235.4; "gold," id. § 23.22; "pearl,' id. § 23 (1968); "braided rugs," id. § 71;
"fruit jam," id. § 114.1; and "cedar chest," id. § 217.2. Some of the terms are of
universal applicability to all products, such as "free' and "comparable value" (see
FTC Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, id. §§ 233.1-233.5), while restrictions on other
words and phrases are meaningful only in relation to specific products such as "moth
repellant" in connection with cedar chests, id. § 217.3.
18. The Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act provides that the Secretary can
promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for a food, "under its common or usual
name so far as practicable," a reasonable definition and standard of identity. 21 U.S.C.
§ 341 (1964) (emphasis added). The effect of the promulgation of such a standard is
to define the food and to prevent the sale of any other food which purports to be or
is represented as the standardized food, but which does not comply with the standard.
See 21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (1964); United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Straw-
berry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950); United States v. 20 Cases
of Buitoni 20% Protein Spaghetti, 130 F. Supp. 715 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d
912 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. 306 Cases of Sandford Tomato Catsup with
Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd sub nom. Libby, McNefll &
Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945). For a review of the circum-
stances under which a food may be considered to purport or to be represented as the
standardized food, see Forte, Definitions and Standards of Identity for Foods, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 796, 811-20 (1966).
19. The glossary is, of course, negative as well as positive, since it describes the
improper uses of words at least as often as the approved uses. The legally binding
Trade Regulation Rules contain restrictions on the use of such words as "automatic"
on sewing machines, 16 C.F.R. §§ 401.1-.5 (1968); "binoculars" for binoculars, id.
§§ 402.1-5; and "leakproof" for dry cell batteries, id. §§ 403.1-.6.
20. Probably the closest example of the similarity lies in the power to regulate cents-
off labeling under section 5(c)(2) of the FPLA. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(2) (Supp. II,
1967). Prior to the FPLA, the FTC had issued its Guides Against Deceptive Pricing
(see note 17 supra), which are concerned with similar practices. While the Guides
were only advisory, the FTC could presumably have re-issued the Guides as a Trade
Regulation Rule which is legally binding. If so, it is difficult to see how FTC's
jurisdiction has been enlarged and indeed, it may be argued that FTC's jurisdiction
has been contracted, since, prior to the FPLA, the FTC might have tried to ban all
cents-off labeling when the manufacturer does not control the retail price on the ground
that such labeling was inherently deceptive. The FTC would find it very difficult to
take the same approach today as the legislative history of the FPLA indicates that
cents-off labeling is to be regulated rather than banned even when the manufacturer




Additionally, both the FDA and the FTC have the power to
prevent the sale of products packed in misleading containers (for
example, deceptively slack-filled foods)21 The FTC's power again is
contained in section 5 of the FTC Act; under this section it can
issue cease and desist orders, 2 guides, rules, and possibly regulations
to prevent the use of deceptive containers.23 The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act allows the FDA to institute seizure proceedings
against foods, drugs, and cosmetics which are packaged in containers
"so made, formed or filled as to be misleading,"4 and, under this Act,
it may also require a disclosure that a food is "Below Standard in Fill"
when its fill fails to meet FDA regulations.2 Under the law prior to
the FPLA, it seems likely that an affirmative disclosure of any slack-
fill would constitute compliance with the law by making the container
not "misleading.'2
In summary, legal restrictions for the economic protection of the
consumer prior to the FPLA were intended to prevent both confusion
and deception in the marketplace. The dominant theme of the law
was that if the consumer was given a full and fair disclosure of the
21. For a review of law prior to the FPLA, see Forte, The Food and Drug Admin-
istration, The Federal Trade Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 860 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Papercraft Corp., (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. para.
16,721 (FTC 1964). Prior cases include Pioneer Specialty Co., 39 F.T.C. 188 (1944);
United Drug Co., 35 F.T.C. 643 (1942); Burry Biscuit Corp., 33 F.T.C. 89 (1941);
Trade Labs, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 937 (1937). See also United States Packaging Corp.,
53 F.T.C. 1174 (1957) (consent order).
23. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 144.8 (1968), prohibiting the sale of slack-filled sardine and
tuna products. The FTC also may have the power to issue trade regulation rules
preventing deceptive slack-fill. See Forte, supra note 21, at 885-87.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 343(d) (1964). Due to its inability to convince the courts that
the seized packages were misleading, the FDA has been uniformly unsuccessful in all
such actions in which the seizure was contested. E.g., United States v. 174 Cases of
Delson Thin Mints, 302 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Cataldo, 157
F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1946); United States v. 116 Boxes of Arden Assorted Candy Drops,
80 F. Supp. 911 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. 738 Cases of Jiffy-Lou Vanilla
Flavor Pudding, 71 F. Supp. 279 (D. Ariz. 1946).
25. 21 C.F.R. § 10.7 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Brennan, Affirmative Disclosure in Advertising and Control of Packaging
Design Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 20 Bus. LAW. 133, 143-44 (1964),
suggesting that such disclosure would probably solve FTC problems. No similar
comment seems to have appeared about FDA, probably because of FDA's abysmal
record in packaging cases even without such disclosure. See note 24 supra. The
Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act specifically provides that an affirmative dis-
closure that a food is "Below Standard in Fill" is sufficient to avoid problems under
the FDA's standards of fill. 21 U.S.C. § 343(h) (1964). Such labeling probably
would have also prevented the container from being misleading and violating section
403(d). 21 U.S.C. § 343(d) (1964). While the FTC might have been able to ban
all unnecessary slack-fill, even in presence of an affirmative disclosure of the empty
space, by issuing a Trade Regulation Rule so providing, no such rules were ever issued
and Chairman Dixon indicated he had doubts about FTC's power to issue such rules.
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facts, he could protect himself sufficiently.27 The Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act, in part, follows the same general principles.
II. TnE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FPLA
In his opening remarks to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, which began an investigation into packaging and
labeling practices in 1961,28 Senator Philip A. Hart of Michigan, the
Subcommittee Chairman, stated that:
The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the information con-
cerning the products on sale is such that the consumer can make a
reasonably intelligent choice between competing products in today's market-
place. Do the packages and labels aid in performing this essential economic
function by giving necessary information, clearly stated? Are packages and
labels designed so that the shopper can reasonably obtain and understand
necessary and significant information pertaining to quantity, quality and
value? Do there appear to be techniques or practices which confound or
confuse the consumer? If so, how extensive are they? Finally, if such
practices do exist, what effect do they have on the producer who does not
engage in them but prefers to use a package and label designed to give
pertinent information in a clear and easily understood manner?29
The manufacturer of consumer commodities was clearly the "target
defendant" of these hearings. The retailer, who was in part respon-
27. There are, of course, important exceptions to this theme. Both standards of
identity for foods and the economic adulteration statutes are based upon the premise
that the consumer cannot protect himself against fraud simply by reading a statement
of the ingredients of a food, and hence an ingredient statement is no defense to a
charge that these laws have been violated. See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act,
§§ 402(b), 403(g), 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(b), 343(g) (1964). See also Forte, Definitions
and Standards of Identity for Foods, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 796, 812-13 (1967), and
Forte, The Food and Drug Administration and the Economic Adulteration of Foods,
41 IND. L.J. 346, 363-65 (1966). However, other labeling may be sufficient to evade
a violation. See Forte, Definitions and Standards of Identity for Foods, supra at 820,
and Forte, The Food and Drug Administration and the Economic Adulteration of
Foods, supra at 364 n.76 (1966). Although theoretically a food labeled and sold as
an imitation of another food may be economically adulterated under § 402(b) (see
Auster, Ordinary English But Not Ordinary jam, 6 Fool Dnu Cosm. L.J. 909,
912-13 (1951)), there are no reported cases in which such a food has ever been
challenged. Such labeling certainly takes the food outside the scope of a standard of
identity. See 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593 (1951). Similarly,
outside the mainstream of consumer protection law are statutes intended primarily to
preserve the economic interests of certain producers by restricting the sale of truthfully
labeled foods. See, e.g., Filled Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1964). When the
issue is economic protection of the consumer, the general rule is that full and
adequate disclosure of the facts is enough to comply with the law. When the issue is
health protection for the consumer, such labeling is, quite properly, often considered
insufficient. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 342(a), 348 (1964), since the conse-
quences can be disastrous for consumers who fail to understand the labeling.
28. Although the subcommittee was given broad authorization to investigate the
sale, marketing and furnishing of consumer goods and services, the investigation quickly
focused upon the packaging and labeling of household consumer products.
29. 1961 Hearings 2.
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sible for the confusion in the marketplace,30 the consumer, who could
have reduced that confusion by more attentive purchasing,31 and the
government officials, who could have prevented much of the con-
fusion by more vigorous enforcement of existing law,2 were all
generally exempted from culpability.
Since there are approximately 6,000 to 8,00033 articles in the average
supermarket, those who desired additional federal regulation of pack-
aging and labeling were able to come to the hearings well-supplied
with consumer complaints and examples of alleged confusing or de-
ceptive labeling and packaging.34 Every complaint which went un-
challenged strengthened the case for new legislation.35 Among their
30. For example, witnesses complained about containers of products bearing cents-off
labeling which were not stamped with prices reflecting the full price reduction indi-
cated in the labeling. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 387 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 58-59
(1963) (hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings); Hearings on H.R. 15440 & S. 985
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
722, 931-37 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966 House Hearings). Since the retailer
stamped the prices on these containers, he was certainly responsible, in part at least,
for the confusion. Similarly, witnesses, ridiculed the proliferation of packages with
different and fractional quantities (e.g.,. "Net Wt. 14 15/16 oz.") which made it
difficult for consumers to compute the price per ounce and make price comparisons.
See, e.g., 1961 Hearings 103-10 and testimony cited at note 37 infra. However, the
approach favored by proponents of the legislation was to try to restrict the manu-
facturer to packaging his product in standard net weights without fractional net
contents. An alternative approach to the same problem would have been to require
the retailer to stamp the price per ounce on all commodities held for sale after ship-
ment in interstate commerce. 1961 Hearings 125-26. This could have set the pattern
for state legislation compelling similar markings on consumer commodities produced and
sold intrastate, but this approach was rejected, apparently because it would be a
burden on the retailer. The reason that retailers were exempted from the congressional
inquiry is probably because they are more numerous than manufacturers and thus
more dificult to regulate and more powerful politically. However, the result is an
incongruity. Despite the congressional concern about price comparisons, there is no
requirement that the retailers stamp the price on consumer commodities or have the
price displayed near consumer commodities to aid consumers in making purchasing
decisions.
31. See, e.g., 1961 Hearings 7, 13, 32, 44.
32. FDA was probably exempted from responsibility on the theory that Congress
had not given it suflicient funds to prosecute this practice. See .1961 Hearings 809, 1963
Hearings 366-67 for suggestions that FDA needed greater appropriations. FTC probably
escaped responsibility because under the Working Agreement between the two
agencies, FDA was supposed to handle these problems. See Forte, supra note 21, at
862 n.8.
33. 1961 Hearings 13; Report of the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 262, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2
(1964) (hereinafter cited as 1964 Senate Report).
34. See, e.g., 1961 Hearings 24-30, 31-42, 71-79.
35. See 1961 Hearings 115-17 for an example of a situation in which a witness
asked minority counsel to explain such complaints. When complaints were not justified,
the manufacturer's reasons for adopting that labeling or packaging were often not
readily available and it was thus impossible immediately to explain why the packaging
or labeling was proper.
1968 ]
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complaints, which were to be a source of controversy in Congress for
the next five years, were: (1) "slack-filled" packages;6 (2) excessive
proliferation of package sizes (which made price comparisons diffi-
cult) ;17 (3) qualifications of net contents statements (e.g., "jumbo half
quart"); 38 (4) net contents statements in obscure locations and type
sizes;39 (5) confusing or deceptive cents-off labeling;40 (6) size desig-
nations which were confusing and had no definite meaning (e.g., "tall,"
"giant" and "king-size");41 (7) distinctively shaped packages which
were difficult to compare visually with other packages;42 (8) deceptive
pictures and symbols on packages;43 (9) misleading identity and
ingredient statements; 1 and (10) representations concerning "serv-
ings" when the quantity of the serving was not described and was
often inadequate.
45
As a result of the hearings, Senator Hart in 1962, introduced a
packaging and labeling bill for the purpose of receiving comments
and suggestions from interested parties.4 6 The bill was revised in the
light of those comments, and on January 21, 1963, Senator Hart
introduced the Truth in Packaging Bill,47 proposing it as an amend-
ment to section 3 of the Clayton Act.48  Following traditional lines
of authority, the bill gave the FDA jurisdiction to promulgate and
enforce all regulations relating to labeling and packaging of foods,
36. See, e.g., 1961 Hearings 6, 26, 37-38, 89.
37. Id. at 6, 10, 49, 103-10, 113-15. Complaints particularly focused on packages
with fractional net contents (e.g., 11 7/8 oz.). The suggested remedy was to limit the
different weights in which commodities can be sold, thus making comparisons of price
per ounce easier. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 6, 25, 74, 76, 91.
39. Id. at 10-11, 26, 35, 37, 40, 73, 88. An early suggestion was to require all net
weights to be printed under the brand name on the package in type proportional to
the label size. Id. at 125. Another suggestion was a uniform location for both the
ingredient and net weight statement. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 34, 76. E.g., "50 off regular price." Manufacturers placing such repre-
sentations on their labels give an allowance to their customers to permit them to
sell the product to the consumer at the reduced price while maintaining their usual
margin of profit. However, witnesses questioned whether the retailer always passed
the saving along to the consumer and whether cents-off had become perpetual for
some products. Id. at 206.
41. Id. at 72, 75, 154.
42. Id. at 26, 34, 37-38, 154-55.
43. Id. at 10, 72, 158.
44. 1961 Hearings 75-76, 161.
45. Id. at 93-94, 154, 209-10, 227.
46. See S. 3745, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), and Hart, Can Federal Legislation
Affecting Consumers" Economic Interests Be Enacted?, 64 Micu. L. REv. 1255, 1257
n.11 (1966).
47. S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
48. § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), prohibits exclusive-dealing con-
tracts and tying agreements which may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce. See generally Rm'onr osF r= A'rr'y
GEN. NAT'L COmm. To STuoy =rr ANurrusT LAws, 137-49 (1955).
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drugs, devices and cosmetics, while the FTC was given jurisdiction
over other commodities. 49  Specifically, the bill directed these two
agencies to promulgate regulations which would: (1) require the
net contents statement to be placed upon the front panel of packages
of consumer commodities and establish minimum standards for the
prominence (including type size) of those statements; (2) prohibit
the addition of qualifying words or phrases to the net contents state-
ment; (3) prohibit cents-off labeling and similar promotions; and
(4) prevent the placement of deceptive illustrations or pictures on
packages of consumer commodities. 0 The bill also authorized the
FDA and the FTC to promulgate discretionary regulations when
necessary to establish or preserve fair competition or to enable con-
sumers to make price comparisons.51 Although the agencies were
required to give interested persons an opportunity to consult with
them prior to the issuance of the regulations, no provision was made
for a hearing prior to the promulgation of regulations. 52 While non-
compliance with the FTC's regulations could only result in a cease
and desist order,5 3 noncompliance with the FDA's regulations could
result in criminal penalties.54 The bill also required manufacturers,
upon request, to send to the FDA or the FTC a sample of each
package used by them.0
The Truth in Packaging Bill was assigned to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and in March and April of 1963, hearings were held by
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly under the direction
of Senator Hart. With the introduction of this specific legislation,
those who opposed regulation of packaging and labeling took the
offensive. Proponents of the legislation could no longer merely
49. S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(d)-(e) (1963).
50. Id. § 3A(c). S. 387 also provided that the regulations adopted by the FDA
and the FTC should be uniform in content and application to the greatest practicable
extent, as determined by consultation between the Secretary and the Commissioner.
Id. § 3A(d) (2).: At a later date, the FDA and FTC acting under the FPLA were
to propose precisely what the sponsors of the original Truth-In-Packaging Bill intended
to prevent-nonuniform regulations for labeling and packaging of consumer commodi-
ties. Compare 32 Fed. Reg. 4172 (1967), with 32 Fed. Reg. 9109 (1967). The
nonuniformity of regulations caused much of the opposition to the FTC's proposal.
51. These discretionary regulations authorized the agencies: (1) to establish the,
reasonable weights or quantities for consumer commodities; (2) to prohibit packages
which might deceive consumers as to quantity; (3) to establish designations of size
which may be used to characterize packages (as "small," "medium," and "large");
(4) to establish the net quantity of a commodity which constitutes a serving; (5) to
establish standards for measuring commodities which cannot be measured meaningfully
by weight, measure or count; and (6) to require the disclosure of ingredients and
composition of consumer commodities. S. 387 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(e) (1963).
52. Id. § 3A(f)(1).
53. Id. § 3A(h)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
54. S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(h)(1) (1963); 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
55. S. 387,88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(g) (1963).
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criticize packaging and labeling practices; they also had to defend
the specific legislation advocated to remedy these practices, and
criticism of this legislation was as abundant as it was intensive.
Critics attacked the substantive provisions of the bil chiefly on the
ground that the practices prohibited were, in general, already illegal
under existing law. They argued that detailed specification of the
type, size, color, and location of the net contents statement was
unnecessary, because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
already required that statement to be prominent and conspicuous.56
Opponents also argued that it was unnecessary to prohibit the addi-
tion of qualifying words to the net contents statements or the use
of deceptive illustrations since the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act already prohibited "false and misleading labeling."51 Finally, the
authority in the bill to bar deceptive packages was attacked as
redundant of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's prohibition
against containers "so made, formed or filled as to be misleading," 8
while the requirement of labeling the composition of products was
considered repetitive of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's
requirement of an ingredient statement on food labels.59 Critics also
challenged the prohibition against cents-off labeling as detrimental to
consumers, 60 the proposed limitations on package sizes or weights as
impractical and likely to cause manufacturers enormous expense,6 1
and government standardization of servings as extremely difficult or
impossible because of differences of opinion concerning what con-
stituted a proper "serving."6
The procedural provisions of the bill also came under serious
attack. The procedure for promulgating regulations was criticized
as inadequate, because it did not provide a hearing,63 and the proce-
dure for enforcing the bill was criticized as improper, because non-
compliance could result in criminal penalties. Critics also contended
that the provision permitting the continued enforcement of more
56. See, e.g., 1963 Hearings 64, 84-85, 664, 743-44, 766. While no similar federal
law governed mandatory labeling of supermarket products other than foods, drugs
and cosmetics, this void was not particularly advantageous to proponents of the legis-
lation. It was clear that the legislation would have had little effect if foods, drugs and
cosmetics were exempted and the bill covered only some so-called kitchen and bath-
room products. See 1963 Hearings 9.
57. Id. at 65, 86, 334, 745, 783.
58. Id. at 66-67, 712-14, 743.
59. Id. at 666-67.
60. Id. at 561, 598-99, 665.
61. Id. at 231-32, 251-52, 784. As witnesses noted, weights and volumes cannot
both be standardized because product densities vary. Id. at 263.
62. Id. at 233, 784-85.
63. Id. at 67-68, 338, 430, 558, 775.
64. Id. at 68, 339, 554-55, 770-71, 775.
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stringent state laws should be changed to pre-empt all such laws.6 5
Although there seemed to be opposition to virtually every substantive
and procedural provision, Senate Bill (S.) 387 was favorably reported
to the full Judiciary Committee, where no action was taken. The
bill, therefore, died at the end of the 88th Congress in 1964.6
In 1965, Senator Hart introduced a revised bill 67 entitled the "Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act," S. 985, which no longer purported to
be an amendment to the antitrust laws and was therefore assigned
to the Senate Commerce Committee rather than the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The new bill expressly precluded the possibility that
criminal penalties could be imposed for noncompliance.68 It also
provided that the discretionary regulations (including limitations on
package sizes) could only be issued after a public hearing6 9 and that
no regulation promulgated under it could take effect until a reasonable
time was allowed to permit persons to comply with the new law.70
The substantive provisions of S. 985 were, however, almost exactly the
same as those of the earlier "Truth In Packaging Bill."
In the 1965 Senate Commerce Committee hearings, witnesses cited
the same general reasons for their oppositions71 to S. 985 as they had
advocated in their opposition to S. 387, again arguing primarily that
existing law was adequate to regulate packaging and labeling. Pro-
ponents of S. 985 argued that the case-by-case enforcement of packag-
ing laws was inadequate and that the FDA and the FTC should be
granted the unambiguous power to issue substantive regulations. 72
Witnesses from these agencies endorsed the bill, thereby substantially
strengthening the argument for the new legislation. 3
Early in the 1965 Hearings it became apparent that the Administra-
tion desired regulation, rather than prohibition, of cents-off labeling? 4
The FDA argued that if cents-off labeling was to be regulated,
65. Id. at 339-41.
66. Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be
Enacted?, supra note 46.
67. S. 985, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
68. Id. § 5(b).
69. Id. § 4(b).
70. Id. § 4(d).
71. See Hearings on S. 985 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 55-68, 96-111, 217-21, 235-63 (1965) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings).
72. Id. at 19-20, 89-93, 357-58, 677.
73. Id. at 23-36, 77-96. The argument that existing law was adequate was industry's
prime argument against both S. 387 and S. 985. This put the FDA and the FTC
in a cross-fire; if existing law was adequate, the question was why these agencies bad
not used this law to prevent packaging and labeling abuses. Both the FDA and the
FTC were probably more comfortable when the Administration supported packaging
and labeling legislation, and they could ascribe abuses in the market to their lack
of authority to handle these practices efficiently.
74. 1965 Hearings 9-12, 17-18, 81-82, 224.
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authority was needed to require the production of cost and pricing
information,7 5 but this suggestion drew no discernable support from
proponents of the bill. The Administration also unsuccessfully sug-
gested that labels should be submitted to the government for approval
before use in commerce,76 while the FDA made a lonely and unsuc-
cessful plea for the reinstatement of criminal penalties in the bill.
7 17
As the controversy continued it grew more bitter; proponents of
the legislation began criticizing and even ridiculing specific products
by their brand names78 and charged that industry was using its
advertising expenditures to get editorials opposing the legislation
printed by leading magazines.7 9
In May, 1966, the Senate Commerce Committee, having made
extensive modification, reported an amended or "compromise"80 bill to
the Senate and recommended its enactment. The revised bill directed
the FDA and the FTC to promulgate regulations requiring a state-
ment of the identity of the product and of the name and place of
business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor8' on the labels as
well as a separate net contents statement, placed in a uniform location
on the principal display panel of the commodity. 2 The net contents
designation was required to be parallel to the base of the package,
stated in ounces,83 printed in conspicuous and contrasting type,84 and
in a type size which was uniform for all packages of substantially the
same size. 8 5 The only other mandatory regulation required by the
bill prohibited the use of qualifying words in conjunction with the net
contents statement. 6 The bill did not authorize the issuance of
regulations prohibiting deceptive illustrations,87 nor did it permit
the prohibition of cents-off labeling, although the FDA and the FTC
were permitted to regulate this practice through discretionary regula-
tions.88
75. Id. at 8, 27.
76. Id. at 9-10, 20, 82, 224.
77. Id. at 7-8, 29.
78. E.g., 1965 Hearings 85. Senator Hart, (D.-Mich.) originally kept all brand names
out of the 1961 Hearings. E.g., 1961 Hearings 73, 83.
79. 1963 Hearings 256-269. See also Hart, supra note 46, at 1261-64.
80. See S. lEP. No. 1186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966
Senate Report). See also Hart, supra note 46, at 1258.
81. S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1966), as reported by the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 1966 Senate Report 33.
82. Id. § 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3)(D).
83. Id. § 4(a)(3)(A).
84. Id. § 4(a)(3)(B).
85. Id. § 4(a)(3)(C).
86. Id. § 4(b).
87. This was an apparent concession to the industry argument that existing law was
adequate.
88. S. 985, 89th Cong., 2 Sess. § 5(c)(3) (1966) as reported by Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 1966 Senate Report 34.
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The discretionary regulations section of the bill was less changed.
The FDA and the FTC were still given the authority to define the
meaning of package size characterizations and servings and to require
labeling of the ingredients and composition of consumer commod-
ities. 89 However, the package standardization sections of Senator
Harts bill were greatly modified. A complex procedure was included
in the bill, whereby producers could join in voluntary package stan-
dardization in cooperation with the Department of Commerce. Upon
failure to do this, the producers might be subject to involuntary
package standardization by the FDA and the FTC.90 The provision
in the original Truth in Packaging Bill permitting the FDA and the
FTC to establish standards for the quantitative designation of com-
modities which cannot be measured meaningfully by weight, measure,
or count9 was deleted in its entirety. Finally, the revised bill pro-
vided that the FDA's and the FTC's regulations were to be promul-
gated in conformity with section 701 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,92 which requires public hearings on proposed regula-
tions when objections are filed raising factual issues. 93
With these modifications, the Senate passed S. 985 by a 72-9 vote
and hearings on the bill and a substitute House bill 4 were then
held in the House Commerce Committee in July, August, and Sep-
tember of 1966. At the House hearings, the industry witnesses centered
their attack primarily upon the package standardization authority in
S. 985 and the House bill,95 basing their opposition primarily upon
the enormous costs likely to be caused by such restrictions.9 6 Govern-
ment witnesses uniformly supported enactment of S. 985,"7 and on
October 3, 1966, the House passed a bill which generally followed
S. 985. However, the House bill differed from the Senate bill in the
following important respects: (1) regulations were authorized re-
quiring dual declarations of net contents (i.e., net weight stated in
ounces and, if applicable, in pounds); 98 (2) although the FDA and
the FTC were not granted the power to legislate the quantity of a
89. Id. § 5(c)(1), (2), (4).
90. Id. § 5(d)-(g), 1966 Senate Report 34-35.
91. S. 985, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c)(5) (1965).
92. S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1966), as reported by the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 1966 Senate Report 36.
93. See Forte, Fair Administrative Hearing: Recent Experience Under The Federal
Food, Drug & Cosmetic & Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 1968 DtnK L.J. 1.
94. H.R. 15440, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
95. See, e.g., 1966 House Hearings 295-306, 314-316; 360-365, 384-390.
96. See, e.g., 1966 House Hearings 485-492, 525-527.
97. Id. at 31-53.
98. S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (3) (A) (1966) as passed by the House.
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serving, as in S. 985,99 a statement of the net quantity of a serving
was required where there was any representation on the label of the
commodity concerning servings; 100 (3) regulations were authorized
prohibiting nonfunctional "slack-fill" (i.e., slack-fill not necessary for
protection of contents of the package or requirements of machines
closing the packages);101 (4) package standardization was made
entirely voluntary and was placed under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Commerce; 10 2 and (5) all state and local laws govern-
ing labeling of the net contents were pre-empted by the federal
statute.101 The Senate-House Conference Committee then switched
the requirement for the disclosure of the net quantity of servings from
the discretionary to the mandatory section of the bill and, with a
few other minor changes,1' 4 the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
was enacted into law.
Although others found the final bill far less significant, Senator
Hart declared that ninety per cent of his original bill was contained in
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and that:
. ..the passage of the Truth in Packaging Bill in its final form is a historic
breakthrough in the area of consumer legislation; that this breakthrough
is the beginning of a long and successful program of consumer assistance
legislation; that the Truth-In-Packaging bill is strong, effective and meaning-
ful legislation.10
Ill. THE FAmI PACKAGING AND LABELING Acr
A. The Ambiguous Policy Declaration
In the FPLA Congress expressly adopted a policy of regulating
packages and labels of consumer commodities so as to assist con-
sumers in obtaining accurate information concerning the net quantity
of contents, and to facilitate value comparisons.'06 The meaning of
this commitment is already a source of dispute among those who
enacted the statute.
-99. -Compare § 5(c)(2) of S. 985 as passed by the Senate, with the same section
as passed by the House.
100. § 5(c) (2) of S. 985 as passed by the House.
101. Id. § 5(c)(5).
102. However, if the Department of Commerce did not receive the cooperation of
manufacturers when it believed limitations on the number of package sizes were de-
sirable, it was to report to Congress with a recommendation for possible future action.
Id. § 5(d), (e).
103. Id. § 12. See also H.R. RP. No. 2076, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
104. These changes are described in STATENENT OF THE MANAGERS ON Tnu PAnT
OF Tm HousE, CoNF. RPta. No. 2286, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
105. Truth-in-Packaging Revisited, 22 FooD DRUG CosM. L. J. 314 (1967).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. II, 1967).
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The commitment to facilitate "value comparisons" was inserted in
S. 985 by the House in lieu of a provision in the Senate bill which
stated that Congress would regulate packages and labels to facilitate
"price comparisons. " 107 The House Conference Report explained:
"The conferees wish to make it clear that the concept of 'value com-
paison' is broader than the concept of 'price comparison' and
includes the latter within the former as a very important factor in
making a value comparison." 10 8 However, there is some dispute over
the use and meaning of the term "value comparison,"'09 which makes
it clear that there was no general commitment in Congress to utilize
revolutionary new proposals in regulating consumer commodities.
Although some Congressmen may have intended to pledge their
allegiance to such goals through the FPLA policy declaration, others
have given the declaration a restrictive meaning. While the phrase
"value comparisons" also appears in the discretionary regulations
section, the apparent confusion resulting from the different meanings
ascribed to the phrase is not likely to have any practical effect upon
the administration of the Act.110
B. The Mandatory Regulations-Identity, Manufacturer,
Net Contents and Servings
Section four of the FPLA requires a statement on the package
label of the most basic information concerning the commodity con-
tained therein."' The importance which Congress attached to such
labeling is reflected in the fact that Congress directed (not authorized)
the FDA and the FTC to issue regulations requiring the disclosure of
this information. Section four provides for regulations which require
107. Compare the Senate version of S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1966), with
that passed by the House.
108. H.R. Co,-'. REt'. No. 2286 on S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
109. Congressman Gilligan (D-Ohio), who authored the phrase "value comparison,"
has explained that price is only one element in a value decision and that it was his
intention in making the change to prevent the agencies from promulgating regulations
solely to facilitate mathematical or "price" comparisons. See Rogers, The Philosophy
behind the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, 22 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 322,
325 (1967). See also 1966 Hearings 164-65. Congressman Rogers (D-Colo.) has
stated that a value decision is a highly subjective decision which government cannot
make for consumers. See Rogers, supra at 325. Senator Harts view is that in aaopt-
ing the phrase "value comparisons" Congress opened the door to a wide variety of
regulations, including grade labeling and government testing of consumer commodities.
Also, Senator Hart has noted that Congressman Gilligan's explanation was made after
the passage of the bill and is, therefore, not a part of the legislative history of the
statute. See Remarks by Senator Hart, supra note 108, at 6.
110. See, Note, Federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 8 B.C. IND. & Co.r. L.
REv. 626, 628 (1967).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1453 (Supp. IT, 1967).
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a statement of the identity and net contents of the commodity, the
name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer or distributor,
and the net quantity of a serving if representations are made concern-
ing servings.
By regulation, the FDA and the FTC have required that the
statement of identity must appear on the principal display panel
of the package. 112 The regulations requiring a statement of the name
and place of business of the manufacturer, packer or distributor
aroused some consternation in the business community, 113 since many
corporations had been using either fictitious or divisional names on
the labels of consumer commodities." 4 These regulations were inter-
preted as requiring a mailing address; however, the street address may
be omitted where the address is listed in a current city directory or
telephone directory." 5 Under the regulations, the city and zip code
must be stated on the label. Initially, the FDA and the FTC imple-
mented in diverse ways the requirement in section 4(a) (2) that the
label bear a statement in a uniform location, of the commodity's net
quantity of contents. The FDA proposed that the statement should
appear on the last line of the label,116 while the FTC proposed that
it should appear in close proximity to the most conspicuous statement
of the trade or brand name.111 Since trade names are placed in
varying locations on commodity labels, the locations of the net con-
tents statement would have varied on packages under the FTC's
jurisdiction." 8 The diversity of these two proposals contrasts with
the original drafts of S. 985 and S. 387, which required that the FDA
and the FTC regulations be uniform in content and application
whenever possible." 9 The deletion of this provision in the final bill
112. See FDA Regs. for Foods, 21 C.F.R. § 1.8(a) (1968) (hereinafter cited as
FDA Begs. for Foods); FDA Proposed Regs. for Drugs & Cosmetics, § 1.102(a) and
§ 1.202(a), 33 Fed. Reg. 404, 405-406, 408 (1968) (hereinafter cited as FDA Regs.
for Drugs & Cosmetics); and FTC Proposed Regs. for Consumer Commodities § 500.
4(a), 33 Fed. Reg. 4718, 4720 (1968) (hereinafter cited as FTC Regs. for Consumer
Commodities).
113. The questions were raised primarily in regard to FDA's First Proposed Begs.
for Foods § 1.8(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 4172, 4173 (1967) (hereinafter cited as FDA's
First Proposed Begs. For Foods), since these were the first regulations proposed under
the FPLA.
114. Several corporations suggested that the fictitious or divisional names had be-
come more familiar and meaningful to consumer than the actual corporate names.
See generally FDA's Rulings on Objections to Food Regs., 32 Fed. Beg. 13276 (1967).
115. See §1.8a, 32 Fed. Beg. 13278 (1967).
116. FDA's First Proposed Begs. for Foods §1.8b (f).
117. FTC's First Proposed Begs. for Consumer Commodities § 500.6, 32 Fed. Beg.
9109, 9110 (1967).
118. It is questionable whether this proposed regulation would have established a
uniform location for the net contents statement as required by law. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1453(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1967).
119. See note 50 supra.
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may have led the FDA and the FTC to believe that Congress intended
each agency to use its independent judgment. The complexity of
selecting a uniform location for the enormous variety of sizes and
shapes of packages may also explain their differing approaches. How-
ever, the decision of both agencies to ultimately use a uniform
location, the bottom thirty per cent of the label, probably was an
important gain for consumer protection.
120
In its proposed regulations, the FDA interpreted the requirement
for a net contents statement to mean a statement of the minimum net
contents, 121 while prior law had required a statement of the average
net contents and unreasonable variations above and below the
stated average were prohibited.'22 The practical impossibility of
making every package contain the minimum contents and the neces-
sity of overpacking to even approach this goal caused a furor in
industry. Some believed that if this regulation became final, manu-
facturers would merely reduce their stated net contents and put
the same quantity in the package, which probably would have re-
sulted in more fractional ounces (e.g., a "1 lb." package might become
"15,76 oz.") and a highly inaccurate net contents statement. - which
re-considered and returned to the "average" requirement,1  which
is also followed by the FTC.1
25
The requirement for a dual declaration of ounces and larger units
of weight and measure in the net contents statement was implemented
by the FDA and the FTC in consistent regulations and without
controversy with industry.12 The statutory provision making ounces
the primary unit for net contents statement was directly contrary to
most state laws and regulations prior to the FPLA. The states had
required the net contents statement to be in the largest unit of weight
or measure. 2 7 The theory behind the new "ounce" declaration of net
contents is that the consumer can moie easily make price comparisons
between competing commodities, 12 since ihe ounce declaration elim-
120. See FDA Begs. for Foods § 1.8b (f); FDA Begs. for Drugs & Cosmetics
§1.102d(e), § 1.202b(f); FTC Regs. for Consumer Commodities § 500.6, all of which
require the statement in the bottom 30% of the label.
121. FDA's First Proposed Begs. for Foods § 1.8b(q).
122. 21 C.F.R. §1.8(i) (1963).
123. As stated in the Declaration of Policy of the FPLA, Congress believes packages
and their labels should enable consumers to obtain "accurate" information as to the
quantity of contents. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. II, 1967).
124. FDA Begs. for Foods § 1.8b(g); FDA Begs. for Drugs & Cosmetics §§ 1.102d
(f) & 1.202b(g).
125. FTC Begs. for Consumer Commodities-§ 500.22.
126. FDA Regs. for Foods § 1.8b(1); FDA Regs. for Drugs and Cosmetics §§ 1.02d
(1), 1.202b(j); FTC Begs, for Consumer Commodities § 500.9.
127. See 1966 House Hearings 692-93.
128. See, e.g., 1966 House Hearings 226.
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inates the necessity for the consumer to convert the net quantity
of the commodities to a common denominator.
The remainder of section 4 requires a statement of the net quantity
of servings if representations are made concerning servings on
product labels, and prohibits "supplemental statements" from appear-
ing in conjunction with the net contents statement;129 however, the
term "supplemental statements" has not been defined by either
Agency.
130
C. The Discretionary Regulations-Package Size Characterizations,
Cents-Off Labeling, Ingredients and Slack-Fill
Section 5(c) of the FPLA authorizes the FDA and the FTC to
promulgate regulations which define package size characterizations,
regulate cents-off labeling, require ingredient statements, and prevent
nonfunctional slack-fill.'13  Most of these discretionary regulations
which deal with more complex problems than the mandatory regula-
tions have not been issued. However, the legislative hearings made
it clear that many Congressmen believed that there is a necessity for
regulation of these practices; it is therefore anticipated that more
discretionary regulations will soon be promulgated.
The authority to define package size characterizations is generally
the authority to determine what packages of each commodity can
be labeled "small" "medium" and 'large." Since these regulations will
have to be issued for each separate category of consumer products,
it will probably take considerable time before regulations are issued
governing any substantial number of commodities. 32
The FDA and the FTC are also authorized to regulate bargain-type
statements,' 33 such as "2 cents off regular price" or "economy size."
When a manufacturer uses cents-off labeling, the cents-off legend is
printed on the label, and the wholesaler or retailer is given an
allowance at least equivalent to the stated price--reduction. How-
129. 15 U.S.C. §1453(4), (5) (Supp. II, 1967). The FTC has by analogy required
the same information for uses and applications as is required for servings. FTC Regs.
for Consumer Commodities § 500.23.
130. "Supplemental statements" apparently refers to other ways of stating the
mandatory information (e.g., placing "1/2 lb." in large type at the top of a package
required to be labeled "8 oz."). See, e.g., 1966 House Hearings 187.
131. 15 U.S.C. §1454(c) (Supp. II, 1967).
132. Id. §1454(a). See 1966 House Hearings 198-201; "Small," "medium" and
'large" would seem to be inherently connected with product identity. For example,
a "small" tube of toothpaste would probably have very different net contents than a
"small" package of potato chips. It would therefore seem to take an enormous period
of time to standardize each size designation for each commodity.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(2) (Supp. II, 1967).
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ever, the manufacturer cannot fix the retail price of the commodity,.3
with the exception of fair trade situations. It was therefore suggested
during the FPLA hearings that the manufacturer was making a price
representation to the consumer which he could not fulfill and that the
proper approach was to give the retailer or wholesaler the allowance
without cents-off labeling.'3 The difficulty with this approach,
however, is that the consumer may be deprived of the benefit, thus
discouraging the manufacturer from further promotions. Although
there was conflicting testimony as to the actual benefit received by
the consumer,136 most industry representatives testified that cents-off
labeling generally worked.137 The end result was a compromise; the
FPLA requires that cents-off labeling be regulated rather than
prohibited.138 The FDA and the FTC regulations will probably pro-
vide that a manufacturer must give an allowance, at least equivalent
to the amount stated in cents-off labeling, if he uses this promotion.
139
Additionally, the regulations will probably provide either that over
fifty per cent of the manufacturer's volume for a given period of time
must be sold without cents-off labeling, or that the manufacturer must
offer his product without cents-off labeling for more than half of a
specified time period. 14 Since the FDA has no subpoena power to
compel the furnishing of information from manufacturers in order
to regulate cents-off labeling,'41 it may have difficulty in enforcing its
regulations.
The regulations for the ingredient disclosure section of the FPLA,
which have been promulgated by the FDA for foods, generally re-
quire that ingredients shall be listed in the order of decreasing
predominance and that when the proportion of an ingredient becomes
material, there must be a quantitative declaration of the ingredient.
142
However, the latter regulation is so vague that it may prove difficult
to interpret and enforce. No ingredient disclosure of cosmetics has
134. See 1966 House Hearings 215 (testimony of Chairman Dixon of the FTC).
An agreement to fix maximum resale prices is as illegal as an agreement to fix minimum
resale prices under the Sherman Act. See -iefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
135. See, e.g., 1963 Hearings 238-240.
136. See, e.g., 1963 Hearirgs 58-59; 1966 House Hearings 50, 931-37.
137. Id. at 423-24, 583-84, 642, 672, 679-80.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(2) (Supp. II, 1967).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 2076, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
140. As the House Report suggests, the FDA and the FTC can regulate either the
duration of and intervals between "cents-off" promotions or the percentage -of annual
output which can be marketed under "cents-off" promotions. Id.
141. 1966 House Hearings 197. The FDA twice during the 1965 hearings stated
that if it were to regulate cents-off labeling rather than prohibit it, Congress should
give it the authority to compel the production of this information. 1965 Hearings-8, 27.




been required by FDA regulations, presumably because the composi-
tion of these products is a trade secret.
1 43
The FPLA also authorizes regulations to prevent nonfunctional
slack-fill in consumer commodities. 144 If these slack-flU regulations
are to be more than generalities, they will have to be issued individ-
ually for each commodity since the amount of settling and the
amount of protective packaging required usually varies with different
commodities. The new regulations are directed at packages which
are filled to substantially less than capacity, thus relieving the FDA
and the FTC of their burden under prior law of proving that the
empty space was misleading or deceptive. 45 However, problems re-
main in determining when a "substantial" slack-fill exists. 146 Even if
the slack-fill is "substantial," it is excused if its purpose is to protect
the contents of the package,147 or if it is necessary for the machinery
to close the package. 48 Finally, it is unclear whether transparent
packages are exempt from slack-fill restrictions. Although the statute
itself provides that deception is no longer an element in slack-fill
cases, the legislative history of the FPLA seems to exclude transparent
containers. 4 9
D. Voluntary Package Standardization-The Department
of Commerce
One of the most significant and effective parts of the FPLA may
be the package standardization program of the Department of Com-
merce. The Act provides that when the Secretary of Commerce
determines that there is undue proliferation of weights, measures or
quantities which impairs the reasonable ability of consumers to make
value comparisons, he shall request manufacturers, packers, and
143. The statute specifically provides that trade secrets cannot be required to be
divulged. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(3) (Supp. II, 1967).
144. Id. § 1454(c)(4).
145. See Federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 8 B. C. IND. & Com. L. REv.
626, 634-35 (1967).
146. The difference in determining whether slack-fill is "substantial" under the
FPLA or "misleading" under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act may be illusory.
It may be argued that slack-fill violates both laws because it is "substantial' (when
compared to competition) and "misleading" (since the ordinary purchaser would not
anticipate extraordinary slack-fill).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c) (4) (Supp. II, 1967).
148. Id. The exemption for slack-fill necessary to protect the contents of the
package and close the package is a direct descendant of the old technological justifica-
tion defense. See Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and The Deceptive Packaging of Foods, supra note 21, at 874, n.71.
149. See H.R. REP. No. 2076, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) stating, "When a
consumer buys a nontransparent package containing a consumer commodity, he expects
it to be as full as can be reasonably expected." (emphasis added).
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distributors to participate in the development of a voluntary product
standard.150 If after a year of the date of the request, the Secretary
decides that a standard will not be published, or, if one has been
published, that it is not being observed, he must report to Congress
with a recommendation for legislative action.15' Such a voluntary
package standardization program will not be all "voluntary."15 2 The
Department of Commerce is not passively waiting for converts, but is
instead advising some manufacturers that they had better agree to a
voluntary package standard. Implicit in this suggestion is the threat
of publicity and danger of congressional action for those who fail
to agree to a standard or depart from it. Also, the FTC may take
action against those who depart from a voluntary package standard.
153
E. Jurisdictional Problems Under the FPLA
One of the Act's unresolved problems is the jurisdictional quagmire
which may result from the fact that the FPLA does not repeal or
supersede the FTC Act,15 which prohibits unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts in commerce. As a result, the FTC
conceivably could prosecute slack-fill, cents-off labeling and similar
practices relating to foods, drugs and cosmetics, even though the
FDA is specifically given the power to regulate these practices under
the FPLA.15 Thus, there may be jurisdictional conflicts between the
two agencies. Additionally, the scope of the FTC's jurisdiction under
the FPLA itself is unclear. Although the FPLA gives the FTC juris-
diction over "consumer commodities," the FTC regulations have
failed to define this term. 156 Instead, the FTC is answering inquiries
individually, and it may be several years before it becomes apparent
what is and what is not encompassed by the FPLA.1'5
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1454(d) (Supp. II, 1967).
151. Id. § 1454(e).
152. See Voluntary Package Controls-The Test Is Going On Now, NATIONAL ASS'N
OF MANUFACTcunES REPOnTS, March 18, 1968, at 15-16, where it is noted that the
initiative is now held by the Government, not industry.
153. Proof of deception would be needed, since regulatory action would be under
§ 5 of the FTC Act. However, there are several cases resulting in cease and
desist orders in which respondents deviated from voluntary agreements and sold frac-
tional net weights. F.T.C. v. Ozark Creamery Co., 8 F.T.C. 377 (1925); FTC v.
Meriden Creamery Co., 6 F.T.C. 444 (1923); FTC v. Wichita Creamery Co., 6 F.T.C.
435 (1923); FTC v. Mountain Grove Creamery, Ice and Elec. Co., 6 F.T.C. 425
(1923).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1460 (Supp. II, 1967).
155. Id. § 1454.
156. A substantial number of comments were filed with the FTC commenting
adversely on the FTC's failure in its proposed Regulation to amplify the term. 33 Fed.
Reg. 4723 (1968).
157. Many inquiries were filed as part of the comments, and these are pending. Id.
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Another jurisdictional problem is the possibility of federal-state
differences. The FPLA seems to pre-empt all state laws providing
for the labeling of the net quantity of contents of consumer com-
modities. 58 However, some commodities are excluded from the FPLA
by the express terms of the statute, while others will be exempted by
administrative action.159 When a commodity is excluded or exempted
from the FPLA, the statute (including the pre-emption clause) may
not apply. Thus, the states may regulate these exempted commodities
if they so choose, thereby negating the practical effect of excluding
these commodities from the FPLA.
IV. THE NEW ALPHABET-ITs SIGNIFICANCE AND FuTuRE
Despite the furor which accompanied its enactment, the FPLA is
much more evolutionary than revolutionary. The mandatory regula-
tions section of the FPLA is only a slight extension beyond prior
law.160 Implicit in this section (and in the discretionary regulations
section) is a continuation of the trend from enforcement of packaging
and labeling laws on a case-by-case basis to enforcement by substan-
tive administrative regulations.161 The underlying theory of the
mandatory regulations is simply that increased affirmative disclosure
of the facts, in the form prescribed by the FPLA and the regulations,
will be beneficial to consumers. The impact of these regulations is
more economic than legal. So far as the manufacturers are con-
cerned, the mandatory regulations are most significant because they
involve a change in the information on labels, and not because of
the particular information required. The change has made obsolete
an enormous investment in artwork and printing plates. The manu-
facturers' resistance to such change is probably strengthened by the
argument that existing law was adequate, and, therefore, that change
was unnecessary.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. II, 1967).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1459(a) (Supp. II, 1967) contains statutory exemptions. It will
be some time before the FDA and FTC complete their rulings on petitions for exemp-
tion by administrative action.
160. The Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act already required a prominent and
conspicuous statement of the net quantity and the name of the manufacturer, packer,
or distributor and place of business on all packaged foods, drugs and cosmetics, 21
U.S.C. 9H 343(e)-(f), 352(b)-(c) (1964), and of the common or usual name on all
food and drugs, Id. §§ 343(i), 352(e). The principal advantages of the FPLA manda-
tory regulations were, therefore, more detailed regulations prescribing the location and
type sizes for the net contents statement and the authority to compel affirmative dis-
closure of the quantity of servings for these products. The FPLA also contained the
same authority for other consumer commodities. However, state laws also covered
much of the subject matter of the FPLA.
161. This is the trend elsewhere in administrative law. See Forte, The GMP Regula-
tions and The Proper Scope of FDA Rulemaking Authority, 56 GEo. L. J. 688 (1968).
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The section authorizing discretionary regulations is the more sig-
nificant portion of the statute. Although the ingredient-labeling pro-
vision rests upon affirmative disclosure, the other provisions for
discretionary regulations go further. The regulations dealing with
slack-fill, package characterization, and cents-off labeling will prohibit
certain practices regardless of disclosure of the facts to consumers, 6 2
on the theory that practices contrary to these regulations are deceptive
per se, even when all facts are disclosed. While this approach is not
unprecedented, the number of per se prohibitions will be substantially
increased by the FPLA. Thus, an analysis of the FPLA reveals its
"new alphabet" to have three major elements: increased affirmative
disclosure of facts, increased regulation of the form of such disclosure,
and increased prohibition of certain packaging and labeling practices
as illegal per se when they tend to-confuse consumers, including the
use of certain words contrary to government definitions. The same
elements will probably also be the basis of future packaging and
labeling proposals for economic protection of consumers.
Under the FPLA, affirmative disclosure of the identity, the net
quantity, and the name of the manufacturer, packer or distributor is
required. 63 It is unlikely that proposals to mark the price on com-
modities will be given serious consideration because retailers are too
politically powerful and too numerous to be easily regulated. There-
fore, proposals for increased affirmative disclosure in the future will
probably relate to the quality of goods. Indeed, such a proposal has
already been advanced by Senator Hart.164 One obvious difficulty in
such a suggestion is the selection of the factors most relevant to a
determination of quality. Since it would seem impossible to disclose
all information relevant to a quality judgment concerning a com-
modity, some selectivity will be necessary. There are probably broad
differences of opinion among consumers concerning those elements
most relevant to a determination of quality, and a decision to disclose
information on a label concerning some elements and not others may
make some products appear more attractive. Such labeling could
easily be the equivalent of a half-truth and, having the implied imprint
of government authority, could be more misleading to consumers than
the representations now made by manufacturers.
162. For example: if the regulations require 85% fill in cereal boxes, it will be a
violation to sell an 80% fill package even if it is labeled "80% full."
163. If representations concerning servings are made on the label, the quantity of
such servings must also be disclosed. 15 U.S.C. § 1453(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1967).
164. See S. 2186, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced on July 27, 1967).
The bill authorizes collection and dissemination of information relating to the value,
quality and suitability of goods affecting consumers. Senator-Hart suggests the informa-
tion relating to such products as washing machines, wall coverings, soaps, paints and
furniture could be disseminated from vending machines placed in stores.
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Similarly, a suggestion that administrative officials be given uncon-
trolled discretion to select those quality factors which should be
disclosed is not likely to be popular with manufacturers, who may
foresee declining sales if the government selects quality factors un-
favorable to their products. It can reasonably be questioned whether
such officials should be given uncontrolled discretion to make deci-
sions having such a significant effect upon our economy. Appointment
to a position with one of the regulatory agencies does not necessarily
qualify one to make value judgments necessary to determine those
elements which comprise quality. While it is true that administrative
officials can be shielded from financial bias in selecting the factors
to be disclosed, they may have an intellectual bias which is just as
troublesome. For example, the FDA once considered artificially
sweetened soft drinks as products which were economically adulter-
ated,'" despite the now well-demonstrated consumer demand for
such products. Additionally, compulsory disclosure of quality ele-
ments might require disclosure of trade secrets. If so, this would
tend to deter the enactment of these proposals.
16
The advantages of further prescribing the form in which facts
must be disclosed are also probably limited. It is now required that
the identity and net quantity of consumer commodities be disclosed
on the principal display panel of packages in certain specified sizes.
617
The ingredients of foods168 and name of the manufacturer, packer or
distributor of consumer commodities must also appear prominently
and conspicuously on labels. 169 While it is possible that additional
information could be moved to the front panel of packages, there are
obvious limitations on the quantity of information which can be
placed there, particularly for smaller packages. It therefore seems
unlikely that additional restrictions on the form of disclosure will
be enacted.
Finally, there is the question of whether additional practices will
be declared illegal per se by Congress. The affirmative disclosure of
165. See United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies (S.D. Ohio 1952), reported
in V. KtznqrEL_ & C. Dmmr, FEDERAL FooD, DRUG, & Cos-imrxc AcT, JUDICLAL AND
ADnsmTRswivE REcoRD 1951-1952, at 141 (1953); FDA Trade Correspondence 311
& 381, V. KU=mFELD & C. DuNN, FEDERAL Fool, DRUG, & CosMEnGc ACT, JUDICIAL
AND Aom~nsmxnv- RECoRD, 1938-1949, at 691, 724 (1949).
166. The sensitivity of Congress to the trade secret argument was made clear in
§ 5(c) (3) of the FPLA, 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(3) (Supp. II, 1967) authorizing regula-
tions requiring ingredient labeling if this did not require divulging of trade secrets.
167. See FDA Regs. for Foods, §§ 1.8(a), (d), 1.8b (f), (i); FDA Regs. for Drugs
& Cosmetics §§ 1.102a, d, 1.202(a), (d), 1.202b; FTC Regs. for Consumer Commodi-
ties §§ 500.4, 500.6, 500.18.
168. FDA Regs. for Foods, § 1.10(h).
169. FDA Regs. for Foods § 1.8a; FDA Begs. for Drugs & Cosmetics §§ 1.102b,
1.202a; FTC Regs. for Consumer Commodities § 500.5.
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the net contents in the form prescribed by law and the limitation on
nonfunctional slack-fill should eliminate any misleading representa-
tions by packages concerning quantity. While Congress could au-
thorize further limitations on the use of certain words on packages,
it is difficult to see where such definitions are needed. It has long
been clear that manufacturers of consumer commodities cannot give
words whatever meaning they choose, since false and misleading
labeling is prohibited by both the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act and the FTC Act. Since Congress has already authorized the
FDA and the FTC to give standardized meanings to representations
concerning quantity and to manufacturers' statements concerning
price, the major elements in purchasing decisions other than quality
elements (which present selection problems) are already regulated.
If the voluntary package standardization program of the Department
of Commerce does not work, there could, of course, also be sentiment
for compulsory package standardization. At present, however, the
voluntary program does seem to be working satisfactorily, and there
is thus no reason to propose involuntary standardization (which would,
in any event, raises the specter of substantial cost increases for manu-
facturers and price increases for consumers).'1°
In summary, it seems that there will be no new letters added to
the new alphabet in the near future. New proposals for regulation
of packaged consumer goods are likely to concentrate on disclosure
of the elements which relate to quality, rather than quantity or price.
However, the problems presented by such proposals are formidable
and may quite properly prevent the passage of any such legislation.
170. The cost objections caused the drafters of the FPLA to make package standardi-
zation voluntary rather than mandatory.
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